Important discoveries

Nederlands Indische Film Festival happened October last year
NIFF - official homepage
Check it out.... much has been done in this subject area. Much material regarding the colony. I would advise that we seek some preview copies so we can see what has been done. Am emailing them today

Along with that.. I found this link to a private list of internees at Tjideng
Anthea's Page
browse it thoroughly and check out the links... its a private list of some people mostly english speaking but some dutch are listed. There are evidently a lot of drawings of the camp interior at a museum in the Hague
Museon

Last but not least there is a statistical page which appears to be quite accurate
it has a lot of references to other accounts which should be pursued at some point
use babel fish to translate this
Japanse burgerkampen

The Theosophical Society and Labour and National Movements in Indonesia, 1913-1918

Paper for the first European Social Sciences History Conference,

Noordwijkerhout,The Netherlands,9-11 May 1996

First, I will briefly introduce the Theosophical Society. Then, I will do likewise for the labour and national movements in Indonesia. Then, I will discuss the relationships between them.

Eric Hobsbawm, writing on the 'age of empire', mentions Annie Besant and the 'apparently non-political ideology of theosophy'. What, then, was appearance, what reality?

The Theosophical Society (TS) was founded in 1875, with occult religious aims. It had members from scores of countries. Much literature sees it as either politically irrelevant or politically Leftist. As I found out working at my Ph. D, often neither was true. Hierarchy was an important element in its philosophy; most of its members were privileged in some way. One can test this in relationships to labour and national movements in Indonesia in 1913-1918.

Among Dutch in the East Indies colony, the TS had the highest proportion of members anywhere in the world. It also had quite some support among the Javanese nobility (priyay). Theosophical supporters put the names of their leaders literally on the map of cities in Java: in Batavia (Jakarta), there was Blavatsky Park; in Bandung, Olcott Park; in Semarang, Annie Besant Square.

Dirk van Hinloopen Labberton, the leader of the TS in Indonesia in the period with which we are concerned, joined in 1899. At first, he was a manager of a sugar factory. Later, he became an official. From 1918-1921, he sat in the first Volksraad, the mock parliament of the Dutch East Indies. Five of its 39 members were Theosophists.

Another Volksraad member was Theo Vreede. He sat on Boards of Directors of various transport businesses. Like his brother Adriaan, he was also a prominent Theosophist. In 1922, Theo Vreede held a speech at Leiden university: 'The lecturer [Vreede] feels sympathy for the trade unions; they should be led towards the right track by the government.' The manager of the East Java Steam-Tram Company may have been thinking here of his brother Adriaan. A. Vreede had been Secretary of the Indies government in the 1910's; by then, he was director of the newly founded government labour office.

The Labour movement in Indonesia

As for the labour movement: in 1908, the trade union Vereeniging van Spoor-en Tramwegpersoneel, the VSTP, was founded for public transport workers. At first, most members were Dutch, but by 1917, Indonesians already formed the great majority. Many of its leaders and members were socialists.

In 1914, the first socialist political organization active in public, the Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging, started. As with the VSTP, at the time it was founded, most members were Dutch; but at least in the Leftist majority tendency, Indonesians eventually predominated.

Many socialists and trade unionists were also active in Sarekat Islam, the biggest organization then. Its members came from diverse groups, like traders, low and middle level civil servants, peasants, and workers. It was a multi-issue movement, concerned not only with Islamic religion, but also with protests against social hierarchy and colonial authority.

Nationalism

There were various nationalisms in Indonesia then, both regional and super-regional forms. In 1912, the same year as Sarekat Islam, the Indische Partij was founded. It demanded independence for the colony as a whole. It had a good relationship to the social democrat party of the Netherlands, the SDAP.

With the Indische Partij, Theosophists' relationships were not as good as some literature says. This showed when the government banned from Indonesia its three leaders Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, and Soewardi Soerianingrat.

Van Hinloopen Labberton, optimistic about winning people to his views, on 6 September 1913 wrote an open letter in the Theosofisch Maandblad voor Nederlandsch-Indië; to Tjipto and Soewardi. He admitted they were courageous as persons; but still, you erred. He urged them:

You love freedom: but did you really think of what true freedom is? ... You really should know that True Freedom may only manifest itself as the tie of law exists and people act according to its limits. ... If you take away from a child that learns how to stand up and to walk, the tie by which the Father kept it up: surely it will stumble and not be free. ... Would you take away a young bird, still unable to fly, from its nest, which, yes, keeps it imprisoned high up in the branches, but which also by its limits saves and frees that youngster from an ignominious fall? Desist from actions like that. ... All that commits violence, all that murders, that soils itself with blood, in that red colour wears the mark of the Antichrist. For the country, only Government authority has the right to wield the club of punishment. It should do this with a merciful heart, though. ... JAVA AND THE NETHERLANDS SHOULD BE ONE. ... not in brute force, but only in Wisdom and Love one may find true progress. May such a force of wisdom and love be granted to you, so that you too may be an instrument to make Java great, jointly with The Netherlands. ... Your Friend and Brother, D. VAN HINLOOPEN LABBERTON.

Apart from all-Indies nationalism, as people then still said, there were regional nationalisms, based on aristocrats. One of the tendencies within the Javanese League Budi Utomo was the Committee for Javanese Nationalism, led by Soetatmo Soeriokoesoemo, from a princely family. There was a similar tendency, led by Datoek [Sumatran title of nobility] Soetan Maharadja in West Sumatra. Both Soeriokoesoemo and Maharadja were Theosophists. This differed from India. There, the international president of the Theosophical Society, Annie Besant, emphasized supra-regional unity. The regionalism of Tamil Nadu, where she lived, had links to her non-Brahman opponents.

Conflicts: conscription

After the Indische Partij leaders had been banned from Indonesia in 1913, they went to a meeting of Indonesians, living in The Netherlands, in The Hague, on the armed forces question. There, they clashed with supporters of the Theosophical Society. During the first world war, that debate continued on a much bigger scale; and this time, mainly in Indonesia itself.

Whether or not the colonial government would introduce conscription for Indonesians became a big issue since 1916. Then, senior civil servants, officers, and businessmen founded a committee, called Indië Weerbaar (Arm the Indies). Many of them were TS members. Without the contacts of the TS among the Javanese élite, the pro-conscription campaign would probably have remained largely an all-European affair. The Theosophical Society supported introducing conscription, arguing from its occult theories. The editor of their monthly, Van Leeuwen, wrote on the social function of conscription:

How difficult it still is for many people to understand that a nation cannot grow, cannot become an economic state, without the painful coercion of duty and necessity. Fighting and militarism are still nearly always seen as the devils in our lives, which we should shirk away from and avoid as much as possible, as it is overlooked how inside every 'devil' a 'deva' [god or angel in Theosophy] hides, who is able to bring us up towards the Light. Pain is the great Initiator. Coercion and fate are the educators of a still infant race [Indonesians] towards a conscious idea of nationality and a high feeling of duty.

However, the trade union of Indonesian government pawnshop employees, the Perserikatan Pegawai Pegadaian Boemipoetera, rejected Indië Weerbaar as it thinks this is militarist propaganda. Besides, this union thinks that militarism strengthens capitalism. Against that, the indigenous people, many of whom are proletarians, should fight.

The biggest union, the VSTP, held the same views. Its chairman, H. Dekker, and his wife, were members of both the TS and the Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging; until Indië Weerbaar started. That double membership was unusual, and did not survive Indië Weerbaar (I do not know whether, and how, the marriage did). H. Dekker resigned from the TS, and attacked Theosophy sharply in the socialist paper Het Vrije Woord. Mrs A.P. Dekker-Groot resigned as Het Vrije Woord's administrator, and from the ISDV.

There was a potential for conflicts between the TS and the ISDV, the Marxists in Indonesia. That potential included: Theosophists were often managers, socialists union activists in the same businesses; they had different philosophies on hierarchy and harmony, showing for instance in issues like housing and voting rights. Still, at first, there had been no big conflicts. However, in ISDV magazines since 1916, Van Hinloopen Labberton, 'the high priest of Theosophy' and of conscription, became the most criticized individual. Semaoen and Darsono, later leaders of the communist party PKI, wrote their first-ever articles against the Theosophists Labberton, and Soetatmo Soeriokoesoemo, respectively.

The ISDV often organized its anti-conscription activities jointly with Sarekat Islam local branches and with Insulinde, the successor organization to the Indische Partie.Warna-Warta, an Insulinde-minded daily, attacked the Theosophical Society. It called Labberton 'Beton' [Malay: concrete], a 'poison to society', and 'the false prophet of theosophy-tai sapi'. Tai sapi is Malay for ox dung.

The journalist Marco went to jail for articles and cartoons against IW. He was a member of the left wing of Sarekat Islam. The right wing of Sarekat Islam's national executive was heavily Theosophically-influenced and pro-conscription in 1916-1918.

The conflict led to deep polarization in SI, in Indonesian society, and against colonial authority. By the end of the first world war, many thousands everywhere in the archipelago demonstrated against conscription. In Ujung Pandang on Sulawesi, three thousand people met against Indië Weerbaar on 25 August 1918. The sailor Arga from West Java told them that the militia plans 'should be kicked to the edge of the universe, as soon as possible.' Nine thousand turned up at a meeting in Kudus, then a small Java town, of the local branch of the PKBT, the Workers and Peasants' League organized by ISDV militants, on 13 October 1918. Darsono and Marco spoke against IW; a motion against it was voted for. ISDV leader Sneevliet was unable to speak, as a car taking him there broke down. Weeks later, the government banned him from the Indies, with the approval of the editorial of the Theosofisch Maandblad voor Nederlandsch Indië.

The government, and Theosophical papers, feared revolution. Conscription was not introduced; it ceased to be a hot issue. But the divisions which had arisen when it was, remained.

We may conclude that the effect of the founding of Indië Weerbaar was contrary to its governmental and Theosophical sponsors' view of harmony along hierarchical lines of social and imperial pyramids.

Dr. H.A.O. de Tollenaere

For references see: H.A.O. de Tollenaere, The Politics of Divine Wisdom. Theosophy and labour, national, and women's movements in Indonesia and South Asia, 1875-1947.
Nijmegen, Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 1996.
ISBN 90 373 0330 7. © 1996 H.A.O. de Tollenaere, Leiden
Published by Uitgeverij Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, Nijmegen, 1996
Address: Postbus 9102, 6500 HC Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Phone +243612073 or +243611794; Central European Time: Mrs. M. Hautvast or Mr. J. Van Loon
E-mail: m.hautvast@uitgeverij.kun.nl

http://www.stelling.nl/simpos/indisch.htm

Back ground on Dutch Expansion into Malay Indonesia

Dutch East India

It was actually political developments in Europe that led to Dutch ambitions in the Malay archipelago. Portugal's days of glory and its Age of Discovery were coming to an abrupt end. By the 1550s, the economy was already in steep decline. Portugal's intolerant attitude towards its conquered peoples and their neighbours meant that its colonies were constantly in need of fresh supplies weapons, ships and men - supplies the small country just did not have. Due to greed, corruption, and mismanagement in its overseas possessions, even the cost of administrating colonies and running trading posts abroad could not be met. The Inquisition finally brought an end to the years of exploration, expansion and exuberance. A crushing defeat at the hands of its Muslims foes, the Moors, in 1578 further weakened the Empire and the Portuguese finally suffered the humiliation of falling under Spanish rule.

At the same time, in 1581, the Protestant Dutch provinces were in open rebellion against their Catholic masters in Spain and they fought the Eighty Years War in their bid to establish Republic of the United Netherlands (de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden). Portugal itself became dragged into Spain's many religious wars with the Protestant nations of Europe.

The Dutch felt that the capture of Portuguese outposts and trade in Asia would be an important second front that would lead towards the eventual defeat of the main enemy, Spain, and they established the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC), in 1602. Even after Portugal gained its independence from Spain in 1640, Dutch power and influence had already grown considerably in Southeast Asia, and the Portuguese enclave in the strategic Straits threatened Dutch naval supremacy. From the view point of trade,. the Dutch considered the conquest of Melaka essential - Dutch commercial policies were based on the principle of monopoly, and the existence of trade emporiums outside Dutch control worked against this strategy. The Dutch tried to establish one such monopoly on tin and early Dutch efforts in the Malay Peninsula were concentrated on securing a firm control of the tin trade on the west coast. The presence of the Portuguese made this difficult. The logical solution to the problem was the capture of the port, and this was achieved by the Dutch in 1641, with the active help of the city's former rulers the Johor Sultanate.

The Dutch adopted their traditional policy of signing treaties with the Malay tin-producing states, followed by the setting up of fortified trading posts or factories, as they were called. The treaties were signed in rapid sequence: Naning signed a treaty with the Dutch in 1641, Kedah in 1642, Junk Ceylon in 1643 and Bangeri in 1645. But these treaties brought little benefit to the Dutch, for much of the tin trade was still in non-Dutch hands. The Dutch at times resorted to sterner measures - building straegic forts and imposing naval blockades - but the monopoly of the tin trade proved elusive.

However, Dutch relations with the Malay powers were more fortunate than the Portuguese. Like the Portuguese, the Dutch had no enthusiasm for territorial conquest in the Peninsula and only sought Melaka as a means to control the Straits. But they did have much stronger naval power and the Dutch were far more successful in dominating the Straits than the Portuguese. In their attitude towards Melaka, the Portuguese and the Dutch differed radically. While the Portuguese tried to make Melaka the centre of their Southeast Asian trade, the Dutch reduced Melaka to the position of just a western outpost of their wider Indonesian empire and they redirected much of the trade towards Batavia. In the field of religion, the Portuguese were zealous in their hatred of Muslims and aggressively converted their subjects to Catholicism. The Dutch, on the other hand, were not interested in an aggressive policy of conversion, and generally did not interfere with local customs and practices.

The major Malay powers which had harassed the Portuguese in the sixteenth century were also now on the decline. The Dutch were already waging successful wars of conquest against the Javanese states in their bid to secure the island. The power of Acheh was already rapidly waning throughout the region. Johor entered into a ruinous war with the Sumatran state of Jambi in 1666 - a war which ended in the destruction of the Johore capital at Batu Sawar in 1673. Court intrigues, and disputes over succession to the throne further undermined the vitality of Johor. Later in the eighteenth century, Johor became an easy prey to Bugis infiltration. For the Dutch, the decline of these powers meant greater security for their own stations and naval attacks and blockades on Melaka no longer took place with the frequency, intensity and scale of the Portuguese era. Friction between the Dutch and the Malay States was quite common but it did not assume threatening proportions. For example, in 1651 the Dutch factory in Perak was destroyed by the Malays, and this was followed by a short period of hostilities, before a peace treaty was signed in 1655.

The situation, however, was radically transformed in the eighteenth century, largely because of the arrival of the Bugis. Originating from Sulawesi, the extension of Dutch power over their islands in the seventeenth century led to Bugis migration overseas, and they came to establish settlements in various parts of the Malay Archipelago. In the Malay peninsula, Bugis settlements were concentrated on the west coast. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Bugis presence was strong enough to become a major influence in Malay politics. Within a few decades, Bugis power became significant in Selangor, Kedah, Perak and Johor - much to the detriment of the Dutch trade. In. 1756, the Dutch in Melaka made the first determined effort to stop the growth of Bugis expansion but the war brought no conclusive result. Bugis influence continued to be dominant, and Riau became their new base, not only for naval operations but also for trade, which successfully encroached on Dutch monopoly.

The Dutch in Melaka were now being politically and commercially isolated from the rest of the Malay Peninsula. The Dutch realised the danger, and in 1782 waged a full-scale war against the Bugis. The Bugis were uprooted from their entrenched positions and the fall of Riau in 1785 marked the collapse of Bugis power in the peninsula. But events in Europe ensured that Dutch supremacy there was short-lived. With the outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, Dutch possessions in Asia, including Melaka, passed into British hands. The foundation of Penang in 1786 and of Singapore in 1819, strengthened British influence in Malaya, and this influence was formally recognised in 1824 with the signing of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty. By then, it was only the British who were left to wield colonial power in the peninsula.

from

http://www.sabrizain.demon.co.uk/malaya/dutch.htm